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Abstract: This paper considers two case studies of 
acquisition of Western manufacturing businesses by 
Chinese firms. It concludes that the underlying 
technology transfers are significantly different from 
contractual forms of technology transfers with an 
exploitation focus.  The limited knowledge that was 
gained through prior technology transfers agreements led 
Chinese manufacturers to occupy unrewarding positions 
in their home market, with no prospect for growth and 
faced with the risk of competitive decline when faced 
with rising labour cost (i.e. with the advent of the 
so-called “Lewis turning point”).  In order to break out 
from this 'middle income trap' the case firms used 
acquisitions and explorative forms of technology transfer 
that allow them to move away from their constrained 
strategic positions and to truly compete with other global 
firms both at home and abroad. 
Keywords: Exploration, Internationalisation, Lewis 
Turning Point. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
There has been a growing interest in the economics 
literature regarding China's status vis-à-vis the “Lewis 
turning point”.  Arthur Lewis's theory [1] is based on 
the observation of the typical stages of development 
patterns of economies that predominantly rely on the 
manufacturing sector.  According to Lewis, national 
economies can derive significant benefits from the 
growth of manufacturing while it is fuelled by the willing 
migration of cheap labour from the primary (principally 
agricultural) sector to the manufacturing sector.  When 
combined with the increasing economies of scale and 
learning curves that can be expected with growing 
manufacturing activities, the unrestricted supply of cheap 
labour to a sector means increasing profitability.  To a 
large extent these factors together are sufficient to 
explain the intensity with which investments can be 
channelled into the manufacturing sector in a relatively 
short period of time.  The supply of cheap labour often 
dries up though. This is usually the case when the rural 
migration to urban areas stops for demographic reasons, 
i.e. there are no more agricultural workers willing to take 
up manufacturing jobs.  The resulting shortage in labour 
can only be managed by raising wages.  The Lewis 
turning point is reached when the increase in the cost of 
labour is such that the competitiveness of the sector is 
negatively affected.  In many countries, economies have 
entered phases of transitions when the Lewis turning 
point is reached, with a typical scenario being a 
transition from manufacturing to the service sector. 
There is no consensus in the literature regarding where 
China currently stands in terms of the Lewis’s turning 
point.   However, there is a consensus that the 
incidence of the turning point will have important 
implications, both in China and globally.  When 
considering China’s manufacturing industry, 
investigating the Lewis turning point raises the question 
of whether or not current manufacturing firms will be 
able to remain competitive.  Economists are sceptical of 
China's ability to do so because of a lack of required 
innovation capabilities and institutional frameworks.  
This would result in China falling into the so-called 
'middle-income trap ' [2] where competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector declines and where few 
opportunities for further growth can be identified.    
In this paper we use recent developments in 
internationalisation theory to investigate this question 
from the lenses of technology transfer.  We argue that 
there are numerous cases in the Far East, usually referred 
to as 'Dragon multinationals' [3], that provide evidence 
that manufacturing companies from the Asia-Pacific 
region can develop sufficient capabilities to become 
sustainable competitors in the global economy and to 
provide sustainable manufacturing activities past the 
Lewis turning point. 
 
2 Relevant Theory 
 
Dunning's eclectic paradigm [4] and 
Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) framework 
have become established reference models to explain 
FDI patterns.  In short, they explain the decision to 
invest is motivated and guided by the ownership of a 
unique technology.  This technology will be sold in a 
different location in order to exploit it further, and this 
process will be managed in adequate ways 
(internalisation) given the risks associated with the new 
location. 
In his analysis of Dragon multinationals, Mathews [3]  
proposes an alternative framework to explain the fast and 
successful growth of multinationals from the 
Asia-Pacific region by considering resources linkage, 
leverage, and learning (LLL framework).  Linkage 
refers to the fact that investments made by Asian 
multinational are resource augmenting rather than 
resource exploiting [5].  Linkages stress the importance 
of acquiring assets outside of the Asia-Pacific region for 
the purpose of accessing knowledge and related forms of 
intellectual capital.  Second, leverage refers to the 
ability of a multinational to make the most out of the 
resulting network of competencies, and thus, echoes 
Kogut's call for the capability to manage real options 
opportunities [6].  Finally, learning refers to the ability 
of the multinational to learn from the application of 
linkage and leverage processes, and again, as such, is 
reminiscent of Kogut's learning options embedded within 
multinational organisations. 
 
3 Research Questions 
 
Although there are differences between the OLI and 
LLL frameworks (for a full account see [3][5][7]), we 
accept Dunning's view regarding the complementarity of 
these two frameworks in order to understand 
international manufacturing expansion programmes.  
We also note that both frameworks are heavily reliant on 
technology transfers taking place between the different 
nodes of a global operations network.   
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the specific 
characteristics and nature of the technology transfer 
processes that are involved in recent case studies of 
manufacturing expansion from the Asia-Pacific region.  
In particular, we are interested in the following 
questions: 
• What type of technology is being transferred? 
• To what extent does the type of technology 
being transferred require a specific mode of 
internalisation (e.g. acquisitions)? 
• To what extent do these technology transfers 
defer from those that have been previously 
studied in a case of FDI inward investment in 
the Asia-Pacific region? 
 
4 Methodology 
 
We use two case studies of recent acquisitions of 
Western firms and brands by Chinese enterprises to 
explore the research questions.  The selection of the 
case studies is based on convenience and access to data.   
We consider the acquisition of IBM’s PC division by 
Lenovo and the acquisition of Volvo Car Corporation by 
Geely.  Most of the evidence used in this paper is based 
on secondary sources, although we also use primary data 
about Geely-Volvo that was collected as part of another 
research project [8]. 
 
5 Case Analysis 
 
5.1 Ownership and technology transfer 
A typical scenario of technology transfer is based on a 
developed country's manufacturer seeking to increase its 
revenue base by licensing the use of its proprietary 
technology in a less developed economy.  In the 
description of such a scenario, Krugman [9] stresses the 
need for the technology seller to continually innovate in 
order to maintain its competitive advantage. 
The account provided by Liu [10] of the acquisition of 
IBM PC by Lenovo tells a different story.  When IBM 
approached Lenovo, its PC manufacturing branch was a 
money losing business crippled by a very high overhead 
burden imposed by headquarters.  It was because of 
Lenovo’s ability to better manage the business, and to 
operate with much lower overheads, that it was able to 
turn a money losing business into a profit-making 
operation.  Thus, in this case, the Western manufacturer' 
assets are valued as low by the parent firm whilst the 
same assets are valued higher by a foreign acquirer.   
Innovation skills and the resulting ability to maintain 
the value of a company’s technology is described by 
Garud and Nayyar [11] as transformative capacity.  By 
acquiring IBM PC, Lenovo did not only invest in the 
operational assets of IBM PC but also in its 
transformative capacity.  
The second case also confirms that the acquisition of 
Volvo Cars by Geely is likely to be driven by the desire 
to appropriate transformative capacity.  Geely's success, 
like that of many Chinese car makers, was based on their 
manufacture of foreign designed cars. The company’s 
first car, the “Geely HQ” was a derivative of Daihatsu 
Charade (built under licence from the Tianjin 
Automotive Company). Then later, through a Shanghai 
subsidiary, Geely released the Maple, a car designed 
using a combination of parts/components coming from 
the Citroen ZX and the Charade.  According to Wang 
and Kimble [12] the Maple is an example of an open 
modular car, a platform on which the growth of Chinese 
car makers is currently based.  The use of open modular 
architecture in car design means that Chinese 
manufacturers are able to produce cars at a fraction of the 
cost of the competition, due to large economies of scale 
in parts manufacturing.  The ability to design such an 
architecture denotes a clear strategic move towards the 
development of transformative capacity.  The 
acquisition of Volvo - a highly valuable brand in Asia, 
but with a bounded market value in the West - is a logical 
step in the pursuit of the development of transformative 
capacity.  As in the case of Lenovo, the technology 
transfer is not only about the acquisition of a technology 
(e.g. a product design) but about the ability to 
independently maintain a portfolio of technologies. 
 
5.2 Location and technology transfer 
In a traditional technology transfer case, location 
analysis deals with the identification of a desirable 
investment destination, e.g. a country with fast growing 
demand but low political risk.  The technology transfer 
cases that we are looking at are different in that the 
decision is not centred on the selection of a destination 
but on the requirements for technology transfers linked 
to competing at home. 
For example, Lenovo was the biggest manufacturer of 
PCs in China, but it only commanded a 30% share of the 
local market and was reported to suffer many 
disadvantages when compared to its competitors [10, p. 
574].  Becoming global was the only solution in order 
to become a key player in both the Chinese and global 
PC industry.  A similar point could be made for Geely, a 
company that faces strong competition not only from 
other domestic manufacturers but also global automotive 
companies.  The facts that China is the fastest growing 
consumer market and the largest market in absolute 
terms have made the Chinese market a competitive 
priority to multinationals.  As a result, Chinese joint 
ventures with multinational automotive companies lead 
in terms of market share, with Shanghai Volkswagen 
taking 17% of the market in 2010, followed by Shanghai 
GM with a 10% market share.  By contrast, Geely's 
market share in 2010 was only 2.9%.  In such a very 
disputed and fragmented market, growing as a domestic 
producer is a difficult strategic challenge.  A solution to 
this challenge is to become global in order to be able to 
compete on the same scale and basis than multinationals 
operating in China. 
 
5.3 Internalisation and technology transfer 
The international technology transfer literature has 
been concerned historically with the negative sides of 
transfer.  These include the risk of leakages of 
technology to a licensee or other third party, and 
technology theft.  Although empirical evidence was 
initially collected to document technology leaks (e.g., 
[13]) this stream of research died out, and recent papers 
about technology transfer tend to only include a token 
reference to the risk of technology leakages, and no 
paper has recently studied the extent and consequences 
of this risk empirically. 
This raises the question of whether or not such 
leakages ever took place, and if they did, to what extent 
the leaked knowledge actually had any strategic and 
commercial consequence? 
To answer this question, it is worth referring back to 
the typical developed-less developed country technology 
transfer scenario discussed by Krugman [9].  In this 
scenario, technology leaks were a key concern and the 
fact that technology was transferred forced the 
technology seller to keep innovating.  Yet, in practice, 
the ability to produce a product under a technology 
license and the ability to design both the product and its 
production process are two different skill sets.  In the 
case of Geely, Wang and Kimble [12] document an 
independent first step away from the mere exploitation of 
technology, and in the case of Lenovo, Liu [10] 
acknowledges issues with product design prior to the 
acquisition.  This confirms that the ability to innovate 
autonomously was desired but limited for these two 
companies. 
In accordance with the work of March [14] we see that 
the distinction between exploration and exploitation can 
be used to differentiate traditional technology transfer 
from the cases of Lenovo and Geely.  Traditional 
technology transfer takes place exclusively in an 
exploitative context. A technology owner seeks to 
increase its revenue base by exploiting its existing 
technology in new markets.  In order to mitigate the risk 
associated with these new markets, it is better to manage 
the investment through joint ventures or non-equity 
ventures (unless the market conditions warrant a direct 
investment).  As the underlying technology transfers 
were exploitative in scope, there was never an actual, and 
rarely an accidental, transfer of proprietary knowledge or 
transformative capacity.  The acquisition made by 
Lenovo and Geely are fundamentally different: their 
scopes are explorative, i.e. they seek to acquire new 
knowledge, technologies, and capabilities.  For this 
reason, they can be only managed through an acquisition 
process.   
 
5.4 Linkages and technology transfer 
When thinking of the acquisition of a manufacturing 
business it is unavoidable to envisage the transfer of 
manufacturing technologies.  Although we possess no 
primary data regarding the transfer of technology for 
manufacturing between IBM PC and Lenovo, Liu's 
account [10] is that the important technology transfers 
were in a different domain; that of cost control and of the 
ability to organise a global businesses by merging two 
entities from radically different national backgrounds. 
This indicates that outward FDI by Chinese firms 
generates value by establishing linkages between all 
parts of the business.  Thus, the acquisitions under 
scrutiny are better described as multi-layered technology 
transfers, which include: 
• A traditional layer: the transfer of tested production 
technologies and product designs. 
• A transformative capacity layer: the transfer of 
knowledge about the management of innovation and the 
ability to maintain one's technology assets. 
• A functional layer: the transfer of technology within 
each business function, e.g., marketing, cost control, etc. 
• A brand structuring layer: the transfer of brand 
equity and brand values that result in the creation of 
brand portfolio. 
 
5.5 Leverage and technology transfer 
In a traditional technology transfer scenario, there 
were no opportunities to seek leverage opportunities 
between the two parties, as the commercial opportunity 
was set and bounded by the technology transfer 
agreement. 
Given the multi-layered nature of technology transfer 
that underpin the two foreign acquisitions by Lenovo and 
Geely, a wealth of leveraging opportunities exist.  
Figure 1 below shows the result of a survey conducted 
by the authors about the quality cues associated with the 
Volvo and Geely brands respectively.  
Figure  1 shows how Taiwanese customers perceive 
the two brands and indicates that in the mind of 
customers the two products are fundamentally different.  
One could see in this fact a simple diversification 
investment in brands whereas we argue that in the 
acquisition of Volvo Cars by Geely there is an 
opportunity for a technology transfer about the ability to 
design reliable and safe products at two different ends of 
the market spectrum, i.e. the economy and premium 
segments. 
 
 
Fig. 1  Comparative top quality cues for Geely and Volvo 
 
It is unlikely that such a technology transfer could 
have taken place at an earlier stage of Geely's existence 
under the variety of previous arrangements in which it 
has participated.  Indeed, a traditional manufacturing 
technology transfer would have included a reliable 
product design transfer but not a systematic transfer of 
knowledge about making product design more reliable.  
Thus, we argue that the acquisition of Volvo Cars by 
Geely was motivated by the ability to transfer a skill set - 
the ability of designing a reliable product- that can be 
used to maintain Volvo's position in its market but also to 
leverage the position of Geely in its entry-level, economy 
product market. 
 
 
5.6 Learning and Technology Transfer 
As traditional technology transfer are contractually 
based, and as they are exploitative in scope, it is 
reasonable to conclude that they will offer very little by 
the way of learning opportunities.  The opposite is true 
of explorative technology transfers. 
Liu's account of the Lenovo's experience is that there 
were many questions marks regarding the direction that 
the company should take [10].  Top managers initially 
retained were eventually dismissed as a new organisation 
form with new values emerged.  
One example of a key question is whether or not 
brands should be maintained or merged?  Lenovo 
initially decided to trade under two separate brands, as 
concerns were initially expressed about the Lenovo 
brand which could lead to losing loyal IBM PC 
customers.  A few years later, the decision was made to 
drop the IBM PC brand and to trade solely as Lenovo.  
Given the efforts that many businesses go through to 
build structured brand portfolios in order to tap into 
different ends of a market, one could wonder if the 
decision to drop the IBM PC brand were not premature?  
The same question applies to Geely - what is the most 
sensible way of maximising the value of the two existing 
brands?  It is from similar questions, stemming from 
linkages and leveraging processes, that both Lenovo and 
Geely are experiencing valuable learning options through 
their acquisition of a Western business. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
This paper has used Dunning's OLI and Matthews' 
LLL frameworks as two complementary lenses of 
investigation to explore the nature of technology 
transfers that underpin the acquisition of Western 
businesses by Chinese firms.  
Our key finding can be explained with March's 
distinction between exploration and exploitation [14].  
Traditional technology transfers are exploitative by 
design.  The fact that very little, if any, transformative 
capacity has been transferred to Chinese firms under 
previous partnering agreements with Western firms 
means that many of these firms have found themselves 
today in a precarious position.  The possibility of China 
reaching the Lewis turning point implies a possible 
further erosion of their competitiveness.  The strong 
dominant positions that multinationals and their brands 
are holding in the Chinese market mean that domestic 
firms are small challengers, lacking the innovative and 
marketing capabilities to break through. 
By acquiring Western companies and brands the two 
cases studies that we investigated have initiated a 
multi-layered form of technology transfer that aims to 
transform the constraining factor of their home location 
into a strength, to develop their limited transformative 
capacity (by seeking asset augmenting rather than asset 
exploiting investments), and to take control of a portfolio 
of assets providing multiple opportunities for linkages 
and leveraging. 
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